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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Scott Cameron Freeland appeals from his conviction for grand theft by 
possession of stolen property. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Freeland with unlawful possession of a firearm and 
grand theft by possession of stolen property, both charges arising out of his 
possession of a Ruger handgun.  (R., pp. 63-64.)  Freeland moved for 
suppression of evidence, contending that officers had unlawfully entered his 
residence and later unlawfully searched his person.  (R., pp. 116-24.)   
 After a hearing, the district court found the following: Freeland rented a 
small house on the Maxwells’ property, the Maxwells asked him to leave for 
failure to pay rent and suspected drug activity, and, after they believed Freeland 
had moved out, the Maxwells entered the small house to clean it.  (R., pp. 162-
63.)  In the house Mr. Maxwell found evidence that Freeland had stolen a Ruger 
pistol from them, although the pistol itself was not found.  (R., pp. 163-64.) 
Mr. Maxwell called the police, gave the responding officer permission to enter the 
small house, and showed the officer the evidence of theft and drug use he had 
found.  (R., p. 164.)  The officer took pictures, filed a “theft report,” and instructed 
the Maxwells to call police if Freeland returned.  (R., p. 164.)   
 The next day Freeland did return and the Maxwells called the police. 
(R., p. 164.)  The responding officers were informed there was a disturbance and 
were also informed about the theft report.  (R., pp. 164-65.)  As they approached, 
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they “saw Freeland’s hands move towards his waist.”  (R., p. 165.)  One of the 
officers drew his weapon and ordered Freeland to put his hands up.  (R., p. 165.)  
When Freeland complied, the officer lowered his weapon.  (R., p. 165.)  The 
other officer went inside the Maxwells’ house while the first officer stayed with 
Freeland.  (R., p. 165.)  The officer with Freeland saw a bulge in Freeland’s 
sweater and asked Freeland to raise his sweater so he could see Freeland’s 
waistband.  (R., p. 165.)  The officer did not see a weapon at that time. 
(R., p. 165.) 
 When the second officer returned he asked if the first officer had frisked 
Freeland, and the first officer said he had not.  (R., p. 165.)  The second officer: 
asked Freeland if he could check Freeland’s pockets, and Freeland 
offered to empty his own pockets. While Freeland was doing so, 
[the officer] observed “hard black plastic” on Freeland’s right hip. 
[The officer] believed this was a holster and immediately demanded 
that Freeland turn around with his hands behind his back. [The 
officer] then frisked Freeland and found a handgun. 
 
(R., p. 165.)   
 The district court declined to decide if Freeland had a privacy interest in 
the small house (assuming so without deciding), but found that the officer had 
implied consent and therefore the search of the small house was constitutional.  
(R., pp. 166-68.)  The district court further concluded that the Ruger handgun 
underlying both charges was discovered as the result of a legitimate frisk. 
(R., pp. 168-69.) 
 Freeland entered a conditional guilty plea to grand theft as part of a plea 
agreement whereby the state dismissed the unlawful possession charge. 
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(R., pp. 197, 201, 208; Tr., p. 193, L. 14 – p. 194, L. 25.)  Freeland filed a notice 
of appeal timely from entry of the judgment.  (R., pp. 216, 223.) 
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ISSUE 
 
 Freeland states the issue on appeal as: 
 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Freeland’s 
motion to suppress? 
 
 (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Freeland failed to show that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion 
that he was armed and dangerous, and therefore that the limited search for 
weapons that revealed the Ruger pistol was unconstitutional? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Freeland Has Failed To Show That The Officers Lacked Reasonable Suspicion 
That He Was Armed And Dangerous 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Freeland asserted in his motion to suppress that officers “impermissibly 
searched him.”  (R., p. 117.)  The state argued that officers properly searched 
Freeland after he “voluntarily consented to a search of his person and actually 
offered to and was engaged in emptying out his pockets which resulted in his 
jacket moving, whereupon [an officer] saw in plain view the end of a gun holster 
on the defendant’s waistband area.”  (R., p. 156.)  Freeland argued, relying on 
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 152 P.3d 16 (2007), that although officers had 
reason to believe he may have been armed, they had no reason to believe he 
was dangerous.  (R., pp. 120-24; Tr., p. 182, L. 7 – p. 185, L. 2.)   
The district court found that officers had reason to believe that Freeland 
had stolen a handgun from the Maxwells.  (R., pp. 164-65.)  It found that when 
officers, responding at night to a disturbance call, encountered Freeland 
“Freeland’s hands mov[ed] towards his waist,” causing one of the officers to draw 
his own weapon.  (R., p. 165.)  The district court also found that an officer saw a 
bulge in Freeland’s sweater.  (R., p. 165.)  Finally, the district court found that 
one of the officers “asked Freeland if he could check Freeland’s pockets” and 
Freeland “offered to empty his own pockets.”  (R., p. 165.)  As he did so, officers 
observed what appeared to be a holster on Freeland’s hip.  (R., p. 165.)  Officers 
then frisked Freeland and found the gun in question.  (R., p. 165.)  The district 
court distinguished Henage and held that, although the officer’s initial suspicions 
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Freeland was dangerous were “dispelled for a time” by his denial he was armed, 
observation of a plastic object that officers believed was a holster demonstrated 
reasonable suspicion that Freeland was dangerous and justified the search. 
(R., pp. 168-69.)  
On appeal Freeland argues “officers started the search of Mr. Freeland’s 
person by having him empty his pockets” and at that time it was unreasonable to 
believe Freeland “posed a risk of danger.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  This 
argument fails on its primary premise: asking consent to search Freeland’s 
pockets was not a search.  Because his argument depends on facts contrary to 
those found by the district court and is contrary to law, Freeland has failed to 
show error.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the 
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.”  State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 
C. The District Court’s Conclusion That Officers Frisked Freeland After 
Seeing The Holster Is Supported By The Facts And The Law 
 
 An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “conduct a limited 
self-protective pat down search of a detainee in order to remove any weapons.”  
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660, 152 P.3d 16,  (2007) (citing State v. 
Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301 (2000)).  Such searches are 
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“evaluated in light of the facts known to the officers on the scene and the 
inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances.”  Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations and 
citation omitted).  The ultimate inquiry is an objective one, which requires the 
court to consider whether the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”  Id. 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).   
The Idaho Supreme Court has further held that “[a] person can be armed 
without posing a risk of danger,” such that the mere knowledge that an individual 
has a weapon is insufficient to justify a frisk; there must also be a basis for 
concluding the armed individual is dangerous.  Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 
152 P.3d at 21.  “Several factors influence whether a reasonable person in the 
officer’s position would conclude that a particular person was armed and 
dangerous.”  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009).  
The factors include whether:  (1) “there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing 
that resembled a weapon”; (2) “the encounter took place at night or in a high 
crime area”; (3) “the individual made threatening or furtive movements”; (4) “the 
individual indicated that he or she possessed a weapon”; (5) “the individual 
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs”; (6) the individual 
“was unwilling to cooperate”; and (7) the individual “had a reputation for 
dangerousness.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “Whether any of these circumstances, 
taken together or by themselves, are enough to justify a [pat] frisk depends on an 
analysis of the totality of the circumstances.”  Id.    
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Applying these factors supports the district court’s holding: (1) there were 
bulges in Freeland’s clothing; (2) the encounter took place at night; (3) Freeland 
made threatening or furtive movements; (4) although Freeland did not indicate he 
had a weapon, officers saw part of a holster; and (5) although Freeland was 
superficially cooperative, he lied about having a weapon.  (R., pp. 168-69.)  The 
district court concluded this last factor, that Freeland lied about being armed, was 
a “critical distinction” between this case and cases where the Idaho Supreme 
Court found no basis for a frisk.  (R., p. 169.)  Application of the relevant law to 
the facts found by the district court shows no error. 
Freeland argues the “officers started the search of Mr. Freeland’s person 
by having him empty his pockets.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  This argument fails 
on the facts and the law.  The district court’s factual findings were that the officer 
“asked Freeland if he could check Freeland’s pockets,” Freeland “offered to 
empty his own pockets,” and the officer saw the holster and “then frisked 
Freeland and found a handgun.”  (R., p. 165 (emphases added).)  These findings 
are supported by the evidence and unchallenged1 on appeal.  The district court’s 
factual findings are that the frisk occurred only after officers saw the holster, not 
when they asked to search Freeland’s pockets. 
Freeland’s argument also fails on the law.  Because the facts do not 
support his argument, and he has not challenged the district court’s factual 
                                            
1 Merely stating facts contrary to those found by the district court is, the state 
submits, insufficient to claim, much less show, clear error.  See Crosby v. 
Rowand Mach. Co., 111 Idaho 939, 942, 729 P.2d 414, 417 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(“The party challenging a judge’s finding of fact has the burden of showing clear 
error.”). 
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findings, Freeland can prevail only if the request to check Freeland’s pockets was 
a frisk as a matter of law.  Freeland cites no authority, however, that asking for 
consent to search is itself a search.  State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not supported by 
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered.”).  To the 
contrary, consent to search is itself an exception to the warrant requirement.  
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted); State 
v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001).  Freeland’s argument that 
requesting consent to search is itself a search is without merit. 
Freeland has failed to show that the district court erred.  At the time of the 
frisk the officers had reasonable suspicion Freeland was armed and dangerous.  
Freeland’s argument that the officers began the search, and therefore needed 
reasonable suspicion, at the time they requested consent to search his pockets is 
without factual or legal merit. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Freeland’s suppression motion. 
 DATED this 27th day of February, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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